- Originally published in the Times Newspapers Limited, May 1, 2005 Copyright 2005 Times Newspapers Limited Sunday Times (London)
THE SECRET DOWNING STREET MEMO.
SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY.
DAVID MANNING.
From: Matthew Rycroft.
Date: 23 July 2002.
S 195 /02.
cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard
Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally
Morgan, Alastair Campbell.
IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY.
Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made.
It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its
contents.
John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment.
Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to
overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was
worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was
not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime
expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that
regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public
was probably narrowly based.
C reported
on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in
attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed
around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no
enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There
was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military
action.
CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.
The two broad US options were: (a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of
250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to
Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus
60 days deployment to Kuwait).
(b)
Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous
air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60
days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.
The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego
Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf
states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for
UK involvement were: (i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three
SF squadrons.
(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.
(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with
a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two
Iraqi divisions.
The Defence Secretary
said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure
on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most
likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January,
with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional
elections.
The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week.
It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided.
But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and
his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We
should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the
UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal
justification for the use of force.
The
Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal
base for military action. There were three possible legal bases:
self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The
first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR
1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of
course change.
The Prime Minister said
that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam
refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were
linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD.
There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the
political context were right, people would support regime change. The
two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had
the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.
On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan
was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.
For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day
one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You
said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added
the Defence Secretary.
The Foreign
Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless
convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests
converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK
differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the
ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.
John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in
only when he thought the threat of military action was real.
The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK
military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned
that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum
route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the
political context to Bush.
Conclusions:
(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any
military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before
we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that
we were considering a range of options.
(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.
(c) CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed
military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.
(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background
on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.
He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of
countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member
states.
(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.
(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.
(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)
MATTHEW RYCROFT (Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)